

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

In re Application of	:	Customer Number: 46320
	:	
Robert ENENKEL, et al.	:	Confirmation Number: 5643
	:	
Application No.: 10/008,473	:	Group Art Unit: 2123
	:	
Filed: November 9, 2001	:	Examiner: T. Stevens
	:	
For: METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR EVALUATING POLYNOMIALS AND RATIONAL FUNCTIONS		

REPLY BRIEF

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents
Commissioner For Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

This Reply Brief is submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 in response to the EXAMINER'S ANSWER dated August 23, 2007.

The Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments submitted in the Appeal Brief of February 16, 2007, raises additional issues and underscores the factual and legal shortcomings in the Examiner's rejection. In response, Appellants rely upon the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief of February 16, 2007, and the arguments set forth below.

1 101 Rejection

2

3 On pages 4-11 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants presented extensive arguments with

4 regard to the Examiner's rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. At the outset, Appellants

5 note that the Examiner "Ground of Rejection" found on pages 3-4 of the Examiner's Answer is

6 essentially identical to the Examiner statement of the rejection in the Fourth Office Action. The

7 Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments is found on pages 13-15 of the Examiner's

8 Answer. Although the section purports to be a "response" to Appellants' arguments, these

9 assertions do not directly address Appellants' arguments. Instead, these assertions raise new

10 arguments not previously presented by the Examiner.

11

12 In the first full paragraph on page 13 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner stated the

13 following:

14 Appellants' summary of the prior art on pages 4 and 5 of the Brief is agreed with.

15 However, appellants' statement regarding the greater precision than the inherent precision of the

16 floating-point number system of the computer system is not considered to be found within the

17 claimed invention. Furthermore, the issue to be considered for the rejection based upon 35 U. S. C.

18 101 is not whether the prior art discloses or makes obvious the claimed invention but whether the

19 subject matter claimed is eligible for patenting.

20

21 Appellants are unaware of any requirement that the claims, themselves, are required to recite the

22 useful, concrete, and tangible result. The function of the claims is not to enable the invention or

23 describe the end result of the invention. Instead, claims are only required to "particularly [point]

24 out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."¹ As

25 noted in the arguments presented on pages 8 and 9 of the Appeal Brief, a statement of the utility

26 can be found in the specification. The Examiner's comment about obviousness neither addresses

¹ Second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

an argument previously presented by Appellants nor appears particularly germane to the issues at hand.

In the second full paragraph on page 13 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner reproduced a passage from Gottschalk v. Benson and asserted the following:

Appellants have admitted that the invention is the solving of a polynomial, albeit at a greater degree of accuracy than has been previously known. Assuming for argument's sake that appellants' invention solves a polynomial to a greater precision than has been known before, the invention as claimed is still not considered to be directed to patent eligible subject matter. Simply put, solving a polynomial is still just solving a polynomial no matter what the degree of accuracy.

At the outset, Appellants note that the first sentence of the above-reproduced passage has mischaracterized Appellants' invention. Appellants' claimed invention is not solely "directed to solving of a polynomial." Moreover, the Examiner's assertion as to "a greater degree of accuracy than has been previously known" also mischaracterizes the invention. As previously noted by Appellants, any specified computer has a known degree of accuracy. The claimed invention is directed to a computer and a computer implemented-method that are capable of providing a computer, with an inherent degree of accuracy in approximating a polynomial, with a greater degree of accuracy. Applicants also note that the Examiner mischaracterized the invention by asserting that "solving a polynomial is still just solving a polynomial no matter what the degree of accuracy." In many instances, polynomials are not solved, they are approximated.

After citing the passage in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Examiner's further asserted the following in the first full paragraph on page 14 of the Examiner's Answer:

The process of solving a polynomial is an abstract intellectual concept, no matter what the degree of precision. It is one of the basic tools of scientific and technological work and as such should not be the subject of a patent.

What the Examiner implies through the Examiner's citation of Gottschalk v. Benson in combination with the above paragraph grossly mischaracterizes the facts. Appellants are not claiming a scientific truth or the mathematical expression thereof. In fact, Appellants are not claiming how to solve the scientific truth of the mathematical expression (e.g., the polynomial). Moreover, Appellants are not even claiming all techniques used to approximate a polynomial. Instead, Appellant are, in part, claiming one particular technique (out of many in the prior art) of approximately a polynomial that has a particular benefit for improving the inherent degree of accuracy of a particular computer.

In the second full paragraph on page 14 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner asserted the following:

The examiner's citation of In re Schrader in the office action is withdrawn. However, it should be noted that it is not the Freeman-Walter-Abele test that is at issue here. It is whether the appellants are claiming an algorithm or not. Here there is no need for a two-part test to determine that appellants' are claiming an algorithm since by its very nature, the process of computing a polynomial is an algorithm. (emphasis added)

Whether or not Appellants are claiming an algorithm is not solely dispositive in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The question is whether the claim, as a whole, is directed to statutory subject matter. In this regard, reference is made to M.P.E.P. § 2106(II)(A), which states:

Finally, when evaluating the scope of a claim, every limitation in the claim must be considered. Office personnel may not dissect a claimed invention into discrete elements and then evaluate the elements in isolation. Instead, the claim as a whole must be considered. See, e.g., *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 188-89, 209 USPQ at 9 ("In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made."). (emphasis in original)

As readily apparent from the Examiner's own comments, the Examiner is not focusing on the claimed invention, as a whole, as required. Instead, the Examiner is focusing only on particular elements of the claimed invention.

In the following paragraph on page 14 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner cites Parker v. Flook. In this regard, Appellants respectfully submit that the Examiner has again cited case law that is not germane to the present issues. Appellants are not claiming a "hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature." Nature does not have a need to approximate polynomials. Instead, nature works by following the laws of nature, in which the laws of nature are solved and not just approximated.

In the last full paragraph on page 14 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner asserted the following:

Furthermore, appellants' claims are so broad as to include both known and unknown uses and thus preempt the field. Any claim that preempts the field is not eligible for patenting. See Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ2d 1385, 1405 (Bd App & Int 2005), "A claim that covers ("preempts") any and every possible way that the steps can be performed is a disembodied "abstract idea" because it recites no particular implementation of the idea (even if one is disclosed)."

Although the Examiner has not specifically identified the "field" that Appellants' claimed invention allegedly preempts, Appellant presumes that this "field" is that of "approximating polynomials." If so, the Examiner's factual support for this alleged preemption is woefully lacking. To allege that Appellants' claimed technique will "preempt the field" evidences a lack of understanding as to how many other techniques have been used.² One of the earlier methods described for approximate polynomials is "Newton's method" named after Isaac Newton, who described the method, which means that a method of approximating polynomials has a priority

² A discussion on polynomials and as to how approximate solution to polynomial equations can be found at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial>.

date that goes back at least three centuries.³ Besides, Newton's method, other methods include the Clenshaw algorithm, the Durand-Kerner method, etc. Thus, the Examiner's assertion that Appellants' claimed invention preempts the field is factually unsupported.

In the paragraph spanning pages 14 and 15 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner further asserted the following:

Appellants' argument concerning the credible utility of improving the precision of a floating-point number system in a computer is noted. It would be conceded that if appellants' claims are found not to be an abstract idea and that the claims do not preempt then they would have a credible utility.

As such, the Examiner admits that the claimed invention has a credible utility.

In the first full paragraph on page 15 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner again cited Gottschalk v. Benson. As already argued above, the Examiner's reliance on this case law is misplaced. Appellants are not claiming a scientific truth or the mathematical expression thereof. Also, Appellants are not just claiming an equation, in isolation, with a computer. Instead, Appellants are claiming a particular technique for use in a computer to improve the precision of a computer and a computer having an improved precision using this technique. This is not analogous to the fact pattern of Gottschalk v. Benson.

In re Comiskey

With regard to determining statutory subject matter, the Honorable Board is directed to the recent decision of the Federal Circuit of In re Comiskey.⁴ Although the Court held several claims directed to non-statutory subject matter, the Court determined that other of the claims

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_method.

⁴ Appeal No. 2006-1286.

were directed to statutory subject matter. In determining the latter, the Court stated the following:

These claims, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, could require the use of a computer as part of Comiskey's arbitration system. (emphasis added)

The Court concluded that the claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 if, under a broadest reasonable interpretation, the claims could require the use of statutory subject matter (e.g., a computer, a device, a product, etc.). The determination of whether or not the claims could require use of a computer need not be made with regard to independent claim 1. Method claim 1 specifically recites a machine-processing method for computing a property which is performed on a machine processing unit. Thus, claim 1 clearly requires that the method is performed using a device. Also, independent claim 23 is directed to a machine. Thus, independent claim 23 clearly requires the use of a machine.

Prior Art Rejections

On pages 11-17 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants engaged in a clause-by-clause deconstruction of claim 1 and the Examiner's rejection thereof. As noted in the first full paragraph on page 12 of the Appeal Brief, the Examiner relied upon Bishop to teach certain basic elements of the claimed invention (i.e., inputting data, computing a property, and outputting data). The Examiner then relied on Kametani to teach the remainder of the limitations recited in claim 1.

The paragraph spanning pages 15 and 16 and the first full paragraph on page 16 of the Examiner's Answer, although addressing certain points made by Appellant, do not appear to be

particular germane. Instead, the Examiner's main assertions made in response to Appellants' arguments appear to be found in the second full paragraph on page 16 and in the paragraph spanning pages 16 and 17 of the Examiner's Answer. Similar to the Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments with regard to the Examiner's rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner does not directly address many of Appellants' arguments. Instead, the two paragraphs written by the Examiner in response to Appellants' arguments appear to be directed, respectively, to steps "a) reading ..." and "d) outputting." As such, the Examiner's rebuttal completely ignores steps "b) building ...," "i) determining ...," "ii) determining ...," and "c) constructing ...," which constitute a substantial portion of the claimed invention.

Notwithstanding the Examiner not directly addressing many of Appellants' arguments, the Examiner initially asserted the following:

Appellants' dispute the Taylor series expansion (e.g., claim 1, lines 4-7) denoted in Kametani to which represent abstract representations of the polynomials set forth in appellants' invention. Specifically, the equations in claims 1 and 23, lines 4-7 and Kametani (column 4, lines 52-66) that are similar in their representation of the summation of multiplying two functions, with one function raised to a power. The functions of Kametani are an abstract representation with different coefficients that mirror the functional intent of the invention. The latter rebuttal is echoed for claims 1 and 23, lines 8-21 as anticipated by Kametani (column 4, line 68). (emphasis added)

Appellants draw attention to the two underlined comments from the above-reproduced passage. In this first comment, the Examiner does not even allege that Kametani identically discloses the claimed limitations. Instead, the Examiner asserts they are "similar" and that the basis for this similarity is "the summation of multiplying two functions, with one function raised to a power." In response, Appellants note that "similarity" is not enough to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. Many inventions are "similar" to what has come before, but this similarity, alone, is not enough to establish obviousness. Also, the Examiner appears to have

simplified Appellants' claimed limitations (and thus ignoring many other limitations) by referring to "the summation of multiplying two functions, with one function raised to a power."

The Examiner's second statement that the functions of Kametani "mirror the functional intent of the invention" is without factual support. The Examiner's analysis is completely silent with regard to specifically identifying the "functions of Kametani" and comparing those functions to that of certain elements of the claimed invention.

The Examiner's final assertion with regard to claim 1 is the following:

Appellants dispute the prior art limitations for claims 1 and 23, lines 22-26 denoting "outputting, via said machine-processing unit, said value of the first polynomial $p(x)$ representing said property of the mathematically modeled physical system, wherein said value of the first polynomial is outputted as a floating point number and the floating point number is a digital representation of an arbitrary real number in said machine processing unit". In this instance, the citations of Kametani in column 2, lines 5-10 and 30-40 denote a series of polynomials. Column 5, lines 15-30, lines 11-15 of Kametani denotes $a_0(X)$ and $a_1(X)$ as a polynomial series to which anyone can deduce the function of $a_0(X)$ is the first polynomial in the series. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention to deduce the floating-point process (Kametani: column 2, lines 45-48), which encompasses various polynomials in order to extract a specific numerical output (Kametani: abstract, lines 1-3 ". . . floating point operation for calculating an approximate solution"). Furthermore, appellants' arguments to the merits of the claims relative to the prior art, only reaffirm the preemption argument, as stated above. (emphasis added)

As noted above, the Examiner continues to ignore Appellants' arguments. The only conclusion made by Appellants with regard to the claimed "outputting ..." step is found on page 17 of the Appeal Brief and is that although the passage cited by the Examiner "describes the use of a 'floating point operation unit,' this passage is silent as to the value of the first polynomial being outputted as a floating point number. The Examiner's analysis, however, completely ignores this argument and proceeds on a tangent having an unknown relevance to the issues at hand.

Moreover, Appellants' note that the Examiner's final argument that "appellants' arguments, to the merits of the claims relative to the prior art, only reaffirm the preemption argument, as stated above" turns, on end, Appellants' prior arguments. For example, on page 11 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants noted that claim 8 of Kametani was directed to "[a] method for floating point operation for calculation an approximate solution ..." Thus, Appellants explicitly recognized that other methods exist for approximating polynomials, which is evidence against the Examiner's preemption argument.

For the reasons set forth in the Appeal Brief of February 16, 2007, and for those set forth herein, Appellants respectfully solicit the Honorable Board to reverse the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103.

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-0461, and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

Date: October 1, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

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CUSTOMER NUMBER 46320